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613 
A DIRE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE 
REFORM 
Patrick Dowdle * 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2010, in U.S. v. Hasan, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia convicted five 
Somali defendants, including Abdi Wali Dire and Mohammed 
Modin Hasan of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651, even though 
their attempted piracy was prevented by U.S. military inter-
vention.1  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions for pira-
cy in 2012 in U.S. v. Dire.2  Section 1651 provides that, 
“[w]hoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as de-
fined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or 
found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”3  The 
District Court used the definition of piracy from the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter 
“UNCLOS”]4 to fulfill the “as defined by the law of nations” 
clause of § 1651.5  The UNCLOS definition of piracy does not 
require the element of robbery, an element that was tradition-
ally central to the commission of a piratical offense.6  Thus, a 
                                                          
* JD Pace University School of Law 2014, served as Articles Editor of 
Pace International Law Review. I owe special thanks to my parents Jim and 
Katherine for their love and support every day of my life. Thank you to also 
to Professor Greenawalt for his guidance and to the Pace International Law 
Review Editorial Board and Senior Associates. Last but not least, a special 
thanks to Managing Editor Catherine Peña and Productions Editor Peter 
Naber, without whom this publication would not have been possible. 
1 United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D.Va. 2010).  
2 United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012).  
3 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).  
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter “UNCLOS”].  
5 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 619. 
6 Id. at 641 (The Court interprets piracy consistently with customary in-
ternational law as evidenced by UNCLOS and the High Seas Convention, 
which do not require the robbery element). 
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failed piracy, or one without actual robbery, can still be consid-
ered a crime of piracy under UNCLOS.  The holding from Dire 
caused a split in United States case law.  
Nineteenth century U.S. Supreme Court case law, under 
U.S. v. Smith, which was affirmed just months before Hasan in 
U.S. v. Said,7 provides that the robbery element is required for 
a conviction of piracy.8 The Dire Court migrated from this prec-
edent to be more consistent with customary international law.9 
I submit that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Dire to veer from 
the dated U.S. case law precedent and apply the UNCLOS def-
inition of piracy, exclusive of the robbery element, was proper.  
However, through an analysis of the numerous problems that 
stem from the current language of § 1651, the issue I present in 
this case note is whether the split in U.S. case law stemming 
from the ambiguity and arguably unconstitutional nature of § 
1651 can be addressed by more effective means than by simply 
deferring to the definition of piracy under the law of nations.    
 In Section I of this note, I will lay out the several reasons 
why § 1651 needs reform.  I will provide background infor-
mation on modern day piracy, including its economic impact, 
and will then break down varying definitions of piracy and 
their applications in recent cases.  I will explore the split in 
U.S. case law caused by the application of the UNCLOS defini-
tion of piracy in Dire, and will identify the quandaries that re-
sult from the UNCLOS definition.  In Section II, I will address 
two specific problems stemming from § 1651 that came to light 
as a result of Dire: first, the inherent vagueness of §1651, 
which led to the differing interpretations and thus to the split 
in U.S. case law; and second, the mandatory life sentence con-
veyed by § 1651.  To address these problems, in Section III, I 
will briefly provide a description of two possible solutions: judi-
cial intervention and legislative reform.  In understanding the 
need to embrace customary international law, and to progres-
sively expand the law beyond the reach of current international 
norms, I will conclude that while the Fourth Circuit was cor-
                                                          
7 United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 567 (E.D.Va. 2010).  The 
Said decision was rendered in the same Court as the Hasan decision, just a 
few months prior.  
8 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 153 (1820).  
9 Dire, 680 F.3d at 459.  
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rect to use a dynamic interpretation when defining piracy in 
Dire, a legislative amendment to § 1651 is the best means of 
addressing the aforementioned concerns. 
I. REASONS FOR REFORM 
Piracy’s Economic Impact 
Aside from the obvious impact on the lives of civilians and 
military personnel, piracy has a tremendous impact on the 
global economy.10  Ninety-five percent of international trade is 
conducted on the high seas, and the estimated cost of pirate at-
tacks ranges from $12 billion to $25 billion annually.11  With 
every Somali pirate the United States Navy captures off the 
coast of Africa, the chances of more pirate attacks decreases, 
not just because specific pirates are in custody, but because 
these operations have the potential to be a general deterrent, 
making the high seas safer for all.  Daniel Pines, Assistant 
General Counsel to the CIA12, stated,   
“Altogether, the U.S. Navy has captured hundreds of pirates and 
thwarted numerous pirate attacks.  The success rate of piracy at-
tacks in the regions of U.S. naval patrols has dropped precipi-
tously—from sixty-three percent in 2007 to thirty-four percent in 
2008 and twenty-one percent in 2009.  Attacks fell forty-three 
percent in 2011, due mainly to military presence.” 13   
 Pines noted that most nations do not want to play an ac-
tive role against piracy because this requires spending money 
for anti-piracy military action, special military training, trans-
porting pirates, housing pirates in jails, and giving them tri-
als.14  “Much of the problem is expense: transporting pirates 
and witnesses to the United States, as well as the actual prose-
cution of pirates in United States courts, can run into the mil-
                                                          
10  Daniel Pines, Maritime Piracy: Changes in U.S. Law Needed to Com-
bat This Critical National Security Concern, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69, 82 
(2012). 
11  Id. at 90. 
12 Pines, Daniel L’s Scholarly Papers, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK 
(2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=915472.  
13  Pines, supra, note 10, at 101-02. 
14  Id. at 79.  
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lions of dollars.”15 Nations like the United States play an active 
role in anti-piracy, while so many others States unfortunately 
seem to be turning a blind eye.  For the safety of civilians and 
military personnel, and for the benefit of the global economy, 
pirates cannot be allowed to terrorize the high seas.  The U.S. 
Code must have the proper legislation to combat the serious 
economic threat piracy poses on the high seas.   
Somalia 
Unfortunately, Somalia has become a hotbed for piracy.16  
Somalia’s government has gone through an eight-year transi-
tional period that culminated last year.17  The turmoil-ridden 
country has recently asked other countries to come to their aid 
and has even instructed foreign military personnel to ignore in-
ternational law in order to maintain peace and prevent upris-
ing.18  This lack of authority makes Somalia an ideal location 
for acts of piracy.  The primary organization of Somali insur-
gents, al-Shabaab, is alleged to have connections to al-Qaeda.  
International security is just one more reason for the United 
States and any other viable countries to combat piracy.19  
Hired Mercenaries 
Some merchants who rely on high sea trade have taken 
anti-piracy into their own hands.  Captains of merchant ves-
sels, disappointed both with the militaries of the world and the 
struggle to combat piracy, have taken it upon themselves to 
hire mercenaries to ward off Somali pirates.20  This tactic, 
                                                          
15  Id. at 107. 
16  See S.C. Res. 1918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010). 
17 Andrew J. Shapiro, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Politi-
cal-Military Affairs, The U.S. Government’s Approach to Countering Somali 
Piracy, Remarks at Combating Piracy Week (Oct. 25, 2012) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/199929.htm).  
18 Jack Serle, US and Others Have ‘License to Ignore International Law’ in Soma-
lia, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www. 
thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/09/24/us-and-others-given-licence-to-ignore-
international-law-in-somalia/. 
19 Jonathan Masters, Al-Shabaab, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 
5, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650.  
20 See David Axe, Pirate-Fighters, Inc.: How Mercenaries Became Ships’ Best 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/4
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which has proven to be successful according to pirate expert 
Martin Murphy21, exemplifies the need to diminish piracy in 
the region spreading from Africa to India.22 
“The world’s governments are waking up to the sobering fact that 
the gazillion-dollar warships they’ve sent to the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean can’t keep up with the region’s elusive pirates.  The 
hijackers’ simple, brutal tactics are too effective.  Their business 
model is too attractive.  And they’ve got nothing to lose but their 
lives.”23   
Numerous merchants have hired former Navy SEALS to 
protect their ships.  It is difficult to blame those travelling on 
the high seas for trying to protect their crew and their goods, 
but fighting pirates with hired guns are not the alternative 
that will best deter pirate attacks.  The goal is to end the vio-
lence, not to fight fire with fire.   
 
Assistant Secretary Andrew J. Shapiro, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs 
In an October, 2012 speech at Combating Piracy Week in 
London, England, addressing piracy in Somalia, Shapiro stat-
ed,  
“This presented a perfect storm for the international communi-
ty.  Somalia, a failed state, provided pirates with a safe haven 
on one of the most strategically important shipping lanes in the 
world – where there was virtually an endless supply of poten-
tial targets to prey on.  In an interconnected world, the impact 
of piracy in one area can ripple across the globe.  People around 
                                                                                                                                  
Defense, WIRED, (Aug. 23, 2011, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2 011/08/pirate-fighters-inc/.   
21  Diana Schemo, 100Reporters Panel: Stolen Seas, 100REPORTERS NEW 
JOURNALISM FOR A NEW AGE (Feb. 5, 2013), 
https://100r.org/2013/02/100reporters-panel-stolen-seas/ (describing how, 
“Martin Murphy, Ph.D., is a consultant, author and strategic analyst with an 
international reputation in the fields of piracy and unconventional conflict at 
sea.  He has taught a course on ‘Piracy, Trade and War’ at Georgetown Uni-
versity and is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, where he is leading a 
major project on naval cooperation involving the U.S. Navy and its longest-
standing allies”). 
22 Axe, supra note 20, at 2.  
23 Id. at 1. 
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the world depend on secure and reliable shipping lanes for 
their food, their energy, their medicine, and consumer goods 
brought by tankers and cargo ships.  By preying on commercial 
ships in one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, pirates off 
the Horn of Africa were threatening more than just individual 
ships.  They were threatening a central artery of the global 
economy – and that in turn means that they were threatening 
global and regional security.”24  
Shapiro discussed how the rate of pirate attacks has de-
creased over the last few years and that fewer successful at-
tacks means fewer hostage situations.25  He applauds the pro-
gress the world is making in combatting piracy, but stresses 
that the ongoing rate of attacks is still unacceptable.26  Shapiro 
quoted Secretary Clinton, who previously stated, “[w]e may be 
dealing with a 17th century crime, but we need to bring 21st 
century solutions to bear.”27  For his goal of ending piracy, 
Shapiro listed his five tactical approaches: military power, col-
laboration with the private sector, legal enforcement, targeting 
networks, and development and governance.28  
 Shapiro ended his speech by stating that the greatest 
long-term solution to piracy is the re-establishment of stability 
in Somalia.29  This is a goal that should not only be revered by 
the international community, but is also a goal that cannot be 
achieved overnight.  The decreasing number of pirate attacks is 
promising, but as Shapiro mentioned in his speech, by prosecut-
ing pirates nationally, the countries of the world can aid in the 
continual downfall of piracy, even as Somalia remains in a 
state of chaos.30  
Countries Turning a Blind Eye 
The United States has emphasized its desire to play an ac-
tive role in combatting piracy.31 Unfortunately, many nations 
                                                          
24 Shapiro, supra note 17.  
25  Id.  
26  Id.  
27  Id.  
28 Id.   
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D.Va. 2010). 
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let pirates go free, as a negative alternative to carrying out 
prosecutions.32  Daniel Pines discussed the resistance of many 
nations to prosecute piracy, despite their ability to do so by way 
of universal jurisdiction.33  The United Kingdom, for example, 
has instructed its Navy to resist from capturing pirates be-
cause such pirates could claim asylum under British law, 
should British forces try to return the pirates to their home 
countries.34  In a two-month period in 2010, European ships 
captured 275 pirates and let 235 of them go.35  This trending 
policy is certainly an ineffective means of deterring piracy.  
Pines regretfully noted, “Piracy is a high-profit, low-risk activi-
ty.”36  It is not the duty of the United States to prosecute all pi-
ratical crimes, however, seeing that U.S. military has decided 
to taken an active approach, legislation is required.  
Universal Jurisdiction 
 There could be certain cases in which the United States 
does not need universal jurisdiction to prosecute pirates.37  
However, whether United States courts need to invoke univer-
sal jurisdiction or not, a proper statute will always be required 
to convict defendants in a suitable fashion.  
 It is no secret that piracy has reemerged as devastating 
crime that is affecting the international community.  While 
other United States statutes require jurisdiction in order to 
prosecute defendants for a crime, all countries have universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute pirates on the high seas.38  The perpe-
trators do not have to be American, the victims of the piracy do 
not have to be American, the crime does not have to be commit-
                                                          
32  Pines, supra note 10, at 78-80, 115. 
33  Id. at 114-15. 
34  Id. at 79.  
35 Id. Pines mentioned that during the same two-month period, the Unit-
ed States caught 39 pirates and let about half of them go free as well. 
36  Id. at 80.  
37 If the crime is committed against an American defendant, takes place 
in American jurisdiction, or has an impact on the United States, the United 
States would not need to invoke universal jurisdiction.  See Roger O’Keefe, 
Universal Jurisdiction, 2 JICJ 735, 752-59 (2004). 
38 Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantanamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of 
Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CALIF.  L. REV. 243, 251-52 (2010). 
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ted in the United States, and the crime does not need to have 
any effect on the United States.39  Since piracy is a crime that 
affects every country that uses the high seas, any country can 
validly prosecute pirates.40  Pirates are universally considered 
to be condemned as hostis humani generis, or enemies of all 
mankind.41  The District Court in Hasan quoted Justice Mar-
shall stating, “[t]hat piracy, under the law of nations, which 
alone is punishable by all nations, can only consist in an act 
which is an offense against all.”42  In this regard, universal ju-
risdiction is an important mechanism in combatting piracy.   
 The District Court in Hasan held that Congress maintains 
the special power to criminalize piracy in a manner consistent 
with the exercise of universal jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Define 
and Punish Clause of the Constitution.43 The universal nature 
of piracy suggests the need for uniformity with international 
law.  The question then becomes which law to apply. 
Defining Piracy: Robbery or No?  
Courts grappling with the definition of piracy have 
searched through various cases to find precedent.  The Privy 
Council of England was confronted with a case related to the 
definition of piracy with In re Piracy Jure Gentium in 1934.44  
The court there held that actual robbery is not an essential el-
ement in the crime of piracy jure gentium.45  The Privy Council 
also ruled that a frustrated attempt to commit a piratical rob-
bery is equal to piracy jure gentium.46  To reach this decision, 
the court relied on a 1926 League of Nations subcommittee re-
                                                          
39 See O’Keefe, supra note 38, at 752-59.  
40 Id.  
41  Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (citing Eugene Kontorovich, Imple-
menting Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of 
the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 139–53 (2004)); Konto-
rovich, supra note 39 (citing LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TREATISE § 272, at 325-26 (1905)).   
42 Dire, 680 F.3d at 454.  
43 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 616. 
44 Dire, 680 F.3d at 457-58 (citing In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 
586, 596-97).  
45 Id. at 458. 
46 Id.  
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/4
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port, which stated, “According to international law, piracy con-
sists in sailing the seas for private ends without authorization 
from the government of any state with the object of committing 
depredations upon property or acts of violence against per-
sons.”47  
 Looking further abroad, the High Court of Kenya heard a 
piracy case in 2006.48  In Republic v. Ahmed, the defendant was 
convicted for piracy jure gentium based on the modern defini-
tion of piracy from international treaties that encompasses acts 
of violence and detention.49  
UNCLOS 
The law of nations, or customary international law, defines 
piracy through UNCLOS.50  The United States is not a party to 
UNCLOS,51 “but has recognized that its baseline provisions re-
flect customary international law.”52 Under UNCLOS, piracy 
includes acts of violence committed on the high seas for private 
ends, but without any actual takings.53  Article 101 of UNCLOS 
states,   
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: a) Any illegal acts 
of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship 
or a private aircraft, and directed: i) on the high seas, against 
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on 
board such ship or aircraft; ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons 
or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; b) 
any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or 
aircraft; c) any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act 
                                                          
47 Id.  
48 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 618 (citing Ahmed v. Republic, (2009) 1 
K.L.R. 198 (H.C.K.) (Kenya)). 
49 See id. at 747.   
50 Id. at 469. 
51 Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to 
the Convention and the Related Agreements as at 23 January 2013, UNITED 
NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, (Jan. 23, 
2013), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ refer-
ence_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm. 
52 United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n. 10, (1992).  
53 See UNCLOS, art. 101.  
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described in subparagraph a or b.  
The UNCLOS definition of piracy is well structured, mod-
ern, and does not require the robbery element.54 The United 
States Code lacks such a detailed statute.    
The United Kingdom and UNCLOS 
With the Piracy Act of 1837, the United Kingdom enacted 
legislation for offenses of piracy: 
Whosoever, with intent to commit or at the time of or immedi-
ately before or immediately after committing the crime of pira-
cy in respect of any ship or vessel, shall assault, with intent to 
murder, any person being on board of or belonging to such ship 
or vessel, or shall stab, cut, or wound any such person, or un-
lawfully do any act by which the life of such person may be en-
dangered, shall be guilty of felony and being convicted thereof 
shall be liable to imprisonment for life.55 
This legislation has since been abolished.  With the Merchant 
Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997, section 26, the Unit-
ed Kingdom simply incorporated therein, Article 101 of 
UNCLOS to be consistent with the modern definition of piracy 
jure gentium.56  
The Djibouti Code of Conduct and UNCLOS 
Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Ken-
ya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, UAE, United Republic of Tanza-
nia, Yemen, South Africa, and Mozambique have signed the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy 
and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean 
and the Gulf of Aden.57  In its definition of general piracy, the 
                                                          
54 Id.  
55  Victoriæ Reginæ, An Act to Amend Certain Acts Relating to the Crime 
of Piracy, CAP LXXXVIII (July 17, 1837) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga 
/1837/88/pdfs/ukpga_18370088_en.pdf.  
56  Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997, 
LEGISLATION.GOV.UK art. 26(1) (1997), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/28/section/26.  
57 Djibouti Code of Conduct, OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY (2012), http:// 
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/activity/djibouti-code-conduct.  
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/4
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Djibouti Code of Conduct uses the modern definition of piracy 
jure gentium from Article 101 of UNCLOS.58  
U.S. v. Hasan 
 On April 1, 2010, on the high seas between Somalia and 
the Seychelles, five defendants, including Abdi Wali Dire and 
Mohammed Modin Hasan, mistook the USS Nicholas for a vul-
nerable merchant ship and attacked the Navy frigate.59  The 
USS Nicholas was on a counter-piracy mission in the Indian 
Ocean, disguised as a merchant vessel.60  Shortly after mid-
night on April 1, 2010, an attack skiff operated by defendants 
Dire, Hasan, and Ali approached the Navy ship.61  Hasan had a 
rocket-propelled grenade  while Dire and Ali had AK-47 assault 
rifles.62  The other two defendants, Umar and Gurewardher, 
were on the mother ship some distance away.63  Dire and Ali 
fired at the Navy ship in order to obtain its surrender.64  These 
shots came close to the crewmembers aboard the USS Nicholas, 
but fortunately there were no casualties.65  The USS Nicholas’s 
crew then responded and an exchange of fire ensued, lasting 
less than thirty seconds, at which point the three defendants 
turned their skiff around and fled for the mother ship.66  The 
USS Nicholas pursued the defendants.67  Commander Kessel-
ring of the USS Nicholas was tactically able to keep his frigate 
located between the skiff and the mother ship.68  Defendants 
                                                          
58  Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes, art. 1, Apr. 3, 2009, C 102/14 IMO 
art. 1, 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%20English.pdf.  
59 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 601.  
60 United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 449 (4th Cir. 2012). 
61 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 601.  
62 Dire, 680 F.3d at 449. 
63 Id.  
64 See id. at 450 (explaining how this attempted strike by the defendants 
is consistent with a pattern of recent Somali pirate attacks, in which pirates 
seize a merchant vessel, return to Somalia with the vessel and the crew, and 
attempt to negotiate a ransom).  
65 Id. at 449. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 See id. (describing Commander Kesserling’s goal of preventing reunion 
between the skiff and the mothership). 
11
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Dire, Ali, and Hasan threw their weapons and a ladder into the 
Indian Ocean.69  After about thirty minutes, the USS Nicholas 
captured the three defendants on the attack skiff and then the 
two defendants aboard the mother ship.70  
 Once in custody aboard the USS Nicholas, the defendants 
separately admitted that they willingly participated in the 
scheme to hijack a merchant vessel on April 1, 2010, and they 
even gave details about the operation.71  The five defendants, 
all Somalis, were transported to Virginia, where they were in-
dicted and tried for, inter alia, piracy as proscribed by 18 
U.S.C. § 1651.72 
 After an eleven-day trial, the defendants were convicted 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia on counts 1 through 14, with the exception of count 
13.73  The defendants were sentenced to life in prison plus 960 
months.74  Specifically, the court imposed mandatory life sen-
tences for Count 1, piracy as defined by the law of nations un-
der § 1651.75  The court also imposed concurrent sentences of 
120 months for Count 2, an attack to plunder a vessel76,  and 
concurrent sentences of 120 months each for Counts 5 and 6, 
assault with a dangerous weapon within a special maritime ju-
risdiction.77 The defendants also received concurrent sentences 
of 240 months each for Counts 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 14, for an act of 
violence against persons on a vessel,78 conspiracy to perform an 
                                                          
69 Id. The ladder was to be used to board the merchant vessel.  
70 Id. A second attack skiff that appeared on radar, but never closed on 
the USS Nicholas, was not found. 
71 Id. at 450. 
72 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2012) (providing that the “trial of all offenses be-
gun or committed upon the high seas…shall be [tried] in the district in which 
the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first 
brought”). 
73 Id. The defendants were not convicted for count thirteen because the 
Court felt count thirteen was duplicative of count twelve.  
74 Id. This sentence amounted to life in prison plus eighty years. 
75 Id. The first count was heatedly contended by the defendants in Hasan, 
after the same District Court had declined to convict pirates in a similar sit-
uation under § 1651 just months before in Said.  
76 18 U.S.C. § 1659 (2012). 
77 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) (2012). 
78 18 U.S.C. §§ 2291(a)(6), 2290(a)(2) (2012). 
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act of violence against persons on a vessel,79 assault with a 
dangerous weapon on federal officers and employees,80 conspir-
acy involving a firearm and a crime of violence,81, and conspira-
cy to carry an explosive during the commission of a felony,82 re-
spectively.  The court imposed additional consecutive sentences 
of 300 months each for Counts 10 and 11, for using, carrying, 
and possessing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence,83 
and 360 months under Count 12 for using, carrying, and pos-
sessing a destructive device in relation to a crime of violence.84  
The Split: Said and Hasan 
In United States legislation, crimes are defined specifically 
by requisite elements.85  The piracy provision in § 1651 simply 
defers to the law of nations without providing specific ele-
ments, which indicates that the United States acquiesces to the 
definition of piracy as it is defined by the current customary in-
ternational law.86  The defendants in Said and Hasan, at-
tempted to fight the constitutionality of such a vague provision.  
While the Said defendants were successful, just a few months 
later, the Hasan/Dire defendants were not. 
Dire, along with his co-defendants, appealed the decision of 
the District Court, primarily on the ground that they never 
completed the attempted piracy.87  The defendants argued that 
because piracy is robbery at sea, and they only boarded the 
USS Nicholas as captives and took no property, they should not 
have been convicted of piracy under § 1651.88   
The omission of specifically laid out elements in § 1651 led 
to the interpretive split in Said and Hasan.  In Said, the court 
                                                          
79 18 U.S.C. §§ 2291(a)(9), 2290(a)(2) (2012). 
80 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1), (b) (2012). 
81 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (2012). 
82 18 U.S.C. § 844(m) (2012). 
83 18 U.S.C. 924 (c)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
84 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).   
85 See e.g., Criminal Law: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law. 
cornell.edu/wex/criminal_law (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
86 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).  
87 Dire, 680 F.3d at 451. 
88 Id.  
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found § 165989 to be applicable to the “attack to plunder a ves-
sel,” and thus held that it would be redundant to hold the de-
fendants liable for the same conduct under § 1651.90 The Dire 
Court affirmed the Hasan convictions under both § 1651 and § 
1659.  
The Hasan Court interpreted § 1651 “as an unequivocal 
demonstration of congressional intent ‘to incorporate ... any 
subsequent developments in the definition of general piracy 
under the law of nations.’”91 The Hasan court disagreed with 
the Said court regarding § 1651 and § 1659 stating, “the de-
fendants defectively ignored the distinct jurisdictional scopes 
provided by § 1651 and 1659.  While § 1659 applies only to acts 
by United States citizens or foreign nationals ‘set[ting] upon’ 
U.S. citizens or U.S. ships, § 1651 provides for the prosecution 
of general piracy with the ability to invoke universal jurisdic-
tion.”92  
On appeal, the Dire Court stated, “[t]he defendants would 
have us believe that, since the Smith era, the United States' 
proscription of general piracy has been limited to ‘robbery upon 
the sea.’  But that interpretation of our law would render it in-
congruous with the modern law of nations and prevent us from 
exercising universal jurisdiction in piracy cases.”93 The Court 
continued, “[t]he defendants' position is irreconcilable with the 
noncontroversial notion that Congress intended in § 1651 to de-
fine piracy as a universal jurisdiction crime…we are con-
strained to agree with the district court that § 1651 incorpo-
rates a definition of piracy that changes with advancements in 
the law of nations.”94 This analysis from Dire led to the proper 
decision in affirming Hasan, as the international community 
                                                          
89 18 U.S.C. § 1659 (2012). “Whoever, upon the high seas or other waters 
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, by sur-
prise or open force, maliciously attacks or sets upon any vessel belonging to 
another, with an intent unlawfully to plunder the same, or to despoil any 
owner thereof of any moneys, goods, or merchandise laden on board thereof, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or 
both.” 
90 Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63. 
91 Dire, 680 F.3d at 460 (citing Hasan 747 F. Supp. 2d at 446). 
92 Id. at 463. 
93 Id. at 468-69. 
94 Id. at 469. 
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has removed the robbery requirement from the crime of piracy 
in nearly all of its multilateral treaties, including UNCLOS.95  
However, issues still linger with respect to the vagueness of § 
1651 and its automatic life-imprisonment sentence. 
Why UNCLOS? 
 The Fourth Circuit in Dire affirmed the District Court’s 
decision to convict the defendants of piracy.96  To support its 
judgment, the court resorted to the definition of piracy as laid 
out in UNCLOS.97  This definition is deemed customary inter-
national law because present therein are the two elements re-
quired for a treaty to crystallize into such binding law: opinio 
juris and state practice.98  “Opinio juris” is the subjective ele-
ment of customary international law, as it refers to the com-
mon opinions of the countries of the world regarding certain in-
ternational practices.99  “State practice” is the objective 
element, which requires that the custom be practiced generally 
in the international community.100  Because the UNCLOS defi-
nition of piracy has crystallized into customary international 
law, the Fourth Circuit in Dire chose to apply this definition to 
be in accordance with the law of nations.  The Court stated, “As 
of April 1, 2010, the law of nations…defined piracy to include 
acts of violence committed on the high seas for private ends 
without an actual taking...the definition of general piracy un-
der modern customary international law is, at the very least, 
reflected in…Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS.” 
 The Dire court chose to refer to the UNCLOS, even 
though the United States is not a party to the convention, be-
cause so many countries in the world are party to UNCLOS.101 
Therefore, while UNCLOS is not binding on the U.S., it is used 
                                                          
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 477. 
97 Id. at 469. 
98 Christopher Greenwood, Sources of International Law: An Introduction, 
AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW pt. 2 (2008), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl 
/pdf/ls/greenwood_outline.pdf.  
99 Opinio Juris (International Law), LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www. law. cornell.edu /wex/opinio_juris_international_law. 
100 Greenwood, supra note 98. 
101 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 633; UNCLOS. 
15
4. PATRICK DOWDLE (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:42 PM 
628 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::1 
 
as evidence of customary international law.  The United States 
is party to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which has 
nearly the exact same definition of piracy as UNCLOS.102  The 
Fourth Circuit chose to use UNCLOS rather than the Geneva 
Convention because UNCLOS is better known around the 
world103 and because UNCLOS was written more recently than 
the Geneva Convention.104  For a treaty to evolve into a ‘norm’ 
of international law, it must be accepted by a majority of 
states, especially those most affected by the treaty.105  Sixty-
three states have ratified the Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas,106 and 161 have ratified UNCLOS.107  This is an over-
whelming majority, as there are currently 192 states party to 
the United Nations.108  All of the nations bordering the Indian 
Ocean on the east coast of Africa, including South Africa, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, and Somalia, are party to 
UNCLOS.109  
 The defendants in Hasan harped on the definition of 
general piracy from Smith, but the District Court ruled that 
since Smith was 200 years old and half a world away, these 
Somali defendants would likely have been more cognizant of 
the UNCLOS definition, than that from Smith, as Somalia had 
just ratified UNCLOS in 1989.110   
Problems with the Definition of Piracy from UNCLOS 
While the Fourth Circuit in Dire stated that the definition 
of piracy under UNCLOS has crystallized into customary in-
ternational law, Daniel Pines argues that there are problems 
with the definition of piracy under UNCLOS that could cause 
difficulties for United States courts in the future.111  The 
                                                          
102 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 633.  
103 Id. at 634.  
104 Id. at 620.  
105 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055. 
106 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 633.  
107 Id.; UNCLOS.   
108 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 633. 
109 Id. at 634.  
110 Id. at 639. 
111 Pines, supra note 10, at 90. 
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UNCLOS definition, for example, specifies that pirates must be 
seeking private ends.112  This ignores potential piracy with oth-
er objectives, such as political agendas or terrorism.113  
UNCLOS also only defines piracy as taking place on the high 
seas.114  Piracy is one of the few crimes that grants universal 
jurisdiction to the international community because no one has 
sole jurisdiction over the high seas.115  While most piracy cases 
will likely occur on the high seas, the UNCLOS definition of pi-
racy would not apply in a case where a vessel was hijacked in a 
country’s exclusive economic zone.116 Therefore, potential de-
fendants could find a loophole if they pirated a vessel near a 
state’s shoreline.  
Furthermore, the UNCLOS definition does not set out spe-
cific punishments for the various offenses of piracy.117  Pines 
notes, “Piracy has always been an international crime enforced 
by national laws, the exact terms of which have varied between 
jurisdictions.”118 The United States should not be leaving the 
definition of piracy up to customary international law, while 
still imposing a mandatory life sentence.  UNCLOS lays out 
specific provisions for piracy, and they do not all contain auto-
matic life sentences.  The United States takes the provisions 
from UNCLOS to define acts of piracy under § 1651, and then 
applies an automatic life sentence.  
The UNCLOS definition is thus too narrow, in that will not 
be applicable in the circumstances just mentioned, and it does 
not lay out specific punishments.  The United States has al-
ready begun, and should continue to play an active role in the 
fight against piracy.  Simply deferring to the UNCLOS defini-
tion of piracy is not the most effective means of combatting the 
crime. 
                                                          
112 Id. at 91.  
113 Id. at 91-92. 
114 Id. at 90-91.  
115 Kontorovich, supra note 39, at 251-52.  
116 UNCLOS, art. 55.  
117 See UNCLOS.   
118 Pines, supra note 10, at 99.  
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SECTION II  
Problem 1: Ambiguity 
Under any interpretation, § 1651 is unconstitutionally 
vague.  Justice Sutherland noted in Connally v. General Con-
struction Co. that the terms of a statute must be explicit to in-
form those subject to the statute; otherwise, the statute is un-
constitutionally vague as it violates due process of law.119  The 
crime of piracy is not explicitly defined in § 1651; rather, the 
provision defers to the definition provided by the law of na-
tions, which is constantly evolving.  The District Court in Ha-
san applied the definition of piracy from UNCLOS.   
Until the Hasan case in 2010, the last United States court 
case addressing the definition of piracy was U.S. v. Smith, 
roughly 200 years ago.120  In its 1820 decision, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the crime of piracy requires 
the specific element of ‘robbery at sea.’121  Following the Virgin-
ia District Court’s 2010 decision in Said, United States case 
law leading up to Hasan and Dire maintained that defendants 
who fail to complete a robbery at sea, on account of an inter-
vention by the United States Navy, could not be convicted un-
der § 1651.122  Then, in U.S. v. Dire, the Fourth Circuit disre-
garded that prior case law and held that U.S. courts should 
apply a more expansive definition of piracy.123  
The Fourth Circuit in Dire ruled that under the law of na-
tions, customary international law as provided by the Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas and the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, defines piracy to merely include 
acts of violence.124  These international, multilateral treaties 
leave out the element of robbery.  United States courts, as 
evinced in Dire, appear to be embracing this trend.  According 
to Dire, United States courts are now interpreting § 1651 by re-
                                                          
119 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).  
120 Dire, 680 F.3d at 456; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820). 
121 Smith, 18 U.S. at 154.   
122 Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 554.  
123 Dire, 680 F.3d at 446.  
124 Id. at 458-69.    
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ferring to the definition of piracy from UNCLOS,125 however, 
this exact definition is not evident from the text of § 1651.  The 
United States Code unequivocally lacks a black law modern 
definition of piracy with elements to embody this contemporary 
standpoint.  
The current text of § 1651 is consistent with customary in-
ternational law in its very language.  The deference to the law 
of nations signifies that the United States yields to customary 
international law when defining piracy.  Section 1651 is prob-
lematic, however, because it does not distinguish to which defi-
nition of piracy in customary international law the United 
States seeks to refer.  This ambiguity led to the split in case 
law between Said and Hasan/Dire.  It is not fair for a court to 
be able to not convict defendants of piracy one day, and then 
convict others for the same conduct just a few months later.  
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Dire is only 
binding in its jurisdiction.  As there is no Supreme Court case 
law addressing the definition of piracy since Smith in 1820, 
should this issue arise in a different U.S. jurisdiction, the re-
sult would be unknown.  Piracy statutes are not required for all 
crimes on the high seas, however, for those are the most seri-
ous, there must be uniformity.  
 Defendants convicted of piracy have two persuasive ar-
guments with respect to the application of § 1651 and its ambi-
guity.  First, as mentioned above, based on binding United 
States case law, the most recent Supreme Court conviction for 
piracy in the United States held that robbery is a required ele-
ment.126  Second, the definition of piracy (and the law of na-
tions in general) evolves over the years.127  
 The Hasan Court rejected the defendants’ ambiguity ar-
gument.  In reversing Smith, the Court determined that “§ 
1651’s express incorporation of the definition of piracy provided 
                                                          
125 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 640. 
126 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820) (This is inconsistent with 
the latest decision of the Fourth Circuit in Dire).  
127 Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 566 (If “the Court accepted the Government’s 
request to adopt the definition of piracy from these debatable international 
sources whose promulgations evolve over time, defendants in United States 
courts would be required to constantly guess whether their conduct is pro-
scribed by § 1651”). 
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by “the law of nations,” which is today synonymous with cus-
tomary international law, provides fair warning of what con-
duct is proscribed by the statute.”128 The Fourth Circuit in Dire 
affirmed this holding.  However, by simply reading the lan-
guage of § 1651, the definition of piracy used in U.S. courts is 
not clear.  Furthermore, courts admit that this definition will 
change over time.  While it is difficult to empathize with those 
standing trial for piracy, providing explicit elements of crimes 
is a vital means of protecting the Due Process of law in the U.S. 
judicial system.  
The United States is striving to be consistent with interna-
tional law, as piracy is clearly an issue with international con-
sequences.  Without indicating which definition will be followed 
in the future United States courts, defendants may be able to 
frustrate attempted prosecutions.129 It was up to the District 
Court in both Hasan and Said to decide the present-day defini-
tion of piracy based on international law at the time of the ar-
rests.  By acknowledging the opposite outcomes from the same 
District Court in the same year, consistency with international 
law is a noticeable issue that necessitates immediate consider-
ation.  As customary international law evolves, the alleged con-
sistency provided by the language of § 1651 will be subject to 
alteration. 
The 2012 Edition of the United States Code, under Title 
18, section 1651, includes a section, ‘Historical and Revision 
Notes,’ which states: 
“In the light of far-reaching developments in the field of inter-
national law and foreign relations, the law of piracy is deemed 
to require a fundamental reconsideration and complete re-
statement, perhaps resulting in drastic changes by way of mod-
ification and expansion.  Such a task may be regarded as be-
yond the scope of this project.  The present revision is, 
therefore, confined to the making of some obvious and patent 
corrections.  It is recommended, however, that at some oppor-
tune time in the near future, the subject of piracy be entirely 
reconsidered and the law bearing on it modified and restated in 
accordance with the needs of the times.”130 
                                                          
128 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 638. 
129 See, e.g., Said, 757 F.Supp.2d at 556.  
130 18 U.S.C. ch. 81 (2012), available at http://uscode.house.gov/download/ 
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There appears no better time to modify the United States 
statutes than now, in the wake of these recurring piracy cases.  
This ambiguity leaves United States legislation without a clear 
definition of piracy.  Courts should not just look to UNCLOS, 
as this caused a split in case law, and as mentioned above, the 
UNCLOS definition has flaws.  United States courts should 
treat UNCLOS more like the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture [hereinafter “Torture Convention”].131 U.S. 
Courts rely on the Torture Convention; however, United States 
legislation contains its own torture statute.132 The torture stat-
ute has specified elements of the crime, and leaves it up to 
courts to impose proper sentencing.133 Having the elements of a 
crime like torture is valuable, because customary norms are 
always evolving.  Additionally, contemporary courts like the In-
ternational Criminal Court have expressed a desire to move 
away from customary international law and have given priority 
to statutory regulation.134 Customary international law is a re-
spected source of international law, however, statutory ele-
ments provide for much more effective adjudication.   
Problem 2: The Mandated Life-Sentence 
The automatic life-sentence imposed by § 1651 amounts to 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution.  The Eighth Amendment states, 
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”135 Justice 
Brennan, in Furman v. Georgia, stated that a severe punish-
ment, which is obviously inflicted in a wholly arbitrary fashion, 
is classified as cruel and unusual punishment.136  It is un-
                                                                                                                                  
pls/18C81.txt.   
131 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. GA. Res. 39/46 Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th 
Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/708, Annex (1984), reprinted in 23 
I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter “Torture Convention”]. 
132 18 U.S.C. 2340(A) (2012).  
133 See Id. 
134 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 
21(1)(a),(b), July 17, 1998. 
135 U.S. CONST. amend VIII.  
136 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281 (1972).  
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doubtedly problematic to issue an automatic life-sentence for a 
crime that is both undefined in United States legislation and 
constantly evolving as the Law of Nations develops.   
The defendants in both Said and Dire argued that the au-
tomatic life-sentence imposed by § 1651 violated their constitu-
tional rights.137  In Said, the court analyzed both § 1651 and § 
1659.138  The Said court held that when defendants attempt to 
pirate a merchant vessel, but never complete the robbery, the 
defendants should be convicted under § 1659 instead of § 1651, 
and should thus receive no more than ten years in prison.139  To 
distinguish between the two provisions of the United States 
Code, the court in Said compared an unsuccessful piracy at-
tempt on a vessel to throwing a rock at a vessel.140  The Said 
court found it illogical to automatically imprison a defendant 
for life for a violent assault on a vessel, (which could be a failed 
piracy or merely throwing a rock at a vessel), when there is no 
actual piracy.141  The defendants in Dire raised a similar argu-
ment, but the Fourth Circuit affirmed Hasan and imposed the 
life-sentence.142 As a result, the Said decision was overturned, 
and the Said defendants were also subjected to the mandated 
life sentence. 
The Hasan and Dire courts rejected the defendants’ consti-
tutional arguments regarding the mandated life sentence.  The 
two Courts gave no explanation regarding the life sentence, ex-
cept that it appropriately followed the convictions under 
§ 1651.  The defendants’ argument concerning the life-
imprisonment is convincing, as United States courts have 
proven to be inconsistent in their punishments of defendants 
that fail at attempted piracies.  The courts’ conduct in Dire vio-
lates the 8th amendment because it applies an automatic life 
sentence for offenses that unquestionably do warrant such.  
When drafting § 1651, it is likely that piracy was meant to ap-
ply to the actual pirating of a ship, which deserves a life sen-
tence.  Assault on a vessel is incomparable. 
                                                          
137 Dire, 680 F.3d at 454. 
138 Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1659 (2012). 
139 Id. at 562.   
140 Id. at 563. 
141 Id.  
142 Dire, 680 F.3d at 454.  
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Most recently, the Eastern District of Virginia distin-
guished the Dire Court’s implementation of the automatic life 
sentence.  The Said defendants were initially found not guilty 
of piracy in accordance with Smith, but the Dire Court over-
turned this decision.  On remand to the Eastern District, on 
February 28, 2014, the Court held that the statutory mandato-
ry life sentence imposed of the defendants, who were convicted 
of piracy under the law of nations, violated the Eighth 
Amendment.143  This holding is entirely appropriate, as cus-
tomary international law, specifically UNCLOS, does not pro-
vide for automatic life sentences.  The Said Court was proper 
in this reversal, and the Dire Court should follow in this fash-
ion.  
All piracy cases are not the same, which is why the defini-
tion of piracy requires specific punishments.  Courts should be 
able to align sentences based on the gravity of the offenses in a 
particular series of events.144  Besides piracy, there are no oth-
er robbery offenses in United States legislation that result in 
automatic life-imprisonment.145   
Piracy is indubitably a crime that warrants severe pun-
ishment.  When defendants successfully pirate a merchant ves-
sel, the life-imprisonment sentence seems appropriate and 
maybe even lenient.  However, due to modern technology and 
increasing military presence around the horn of Africa, the cas-
es are not always this simple.  The definition of piracy needs to 
be narrowed, with particular punishments so as not to violate 
the Eighth Amendment.  The other option would be committing 
to the life sentence, but should this be the case, Courts should 
not be taking the definition of piracy from UNCLOS, which 
does not apply such sentencing.  Recent cases like Said and 
Dire have made it clear that while applying customary interna-
tional law definitions is appropriate, United States courts re-
quire judicial discretion when issuing punishments, instead of 
having to automatically hand out life-sentences.  
                                                          
143 United States v. Said, 2014 WL 806230 (E.D.Va. 2014).  
144 See supra text accompanying note 131. 
145 See 18 U.S.C. ch. 103 (2012), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
uscode/text/18/part-I/chapter-103.  
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SECTION III 
In the wake of cases like Dire and Said, the unconstitu-
tionality of § 1651 needs to be addressed.  The United States 
courts and legislature are on the right track by embracing cus-
tomary international law, however, a solution is needed to pro-
gressively expand the law beyond the current reach of custom-
ary international law and UNCLOS.  
Solution 1: Judicial Intervention 
A possible means of clarifying the elements for the crime of 
piracy in the United States would be for the Supreme Court to 
hear a piracy case and update its interpretation of § 1651.  The 
last Supreme Court case dealing with piracy was heard in 
1820,146 so it would be beneficial for the Court to weigh in on 
the crime while taking into account modern advancements in 
piracy and piracy prevention.  After the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the District Court’s decision in Dire, the defendants pe-
titioned the United States Supreme Court by a writ of certiora-
ri.147 The Supreme Court denied the petition on January 22, 
2013, and thus the ambiguity remains.148   
By delivering a decision, the Supreme Court could have is-
sued modern law that would be binding on all U.S. jurisdic-
tions.149 Until the Supreme Court hears a piracy case implicat-
ing § 1651, the Fourth Circuit’s holding from Dire, while not 
binding in other jurisdictions, will act as persuasive prece-
dent.150 The Supreme Court could have granted the writ and 
held that the definition of piracy from UNCLOS is binding on 
U.S. courts, or in the alternative, that Smith is still good law.  
The Dire Court interpreted § 1651 by applying the UNCLOS 
definition of piracy, which while aiding with the vagueness of 
the statute, does not solve the mandated life sentence issue.  
The Supreme Court could have determined that while the defi-
                                                          
146 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820). 
147 United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S.Ct. 982 (U.S.  2013).  
148 Id.  
149 See Barbara Bintliff, Mandatory v. Persuasive Cases, WEST GROUP 
(2001), http://faculty.law.lsu.edu/toddbruno/mandatory_v__persuasive.htm.  
150 See Id.  
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nition of piracy from UNCLOS will be applied under the law of 
nations, the mandated life sentence is no longer applicable.  By 
redacting this clause from § 1651, the Court could have granted 
judicial discretion to courts dealing with piracy issues in forth-
coming trials.  
Regardless of potential judicial intervention, customary in-
ternational law is constantly evolving.  Therefore, even if the 
Supreme Court weighed in with a decision defining piracy and 
the punishments therein, a statute would still be a more effec-
tive means of implementing law to address prospective circum-
stances. 
Solution 2: Legislative Reform 
The more effective solution for addressing the problems set 
forth by § 1651 would be for Congress to write a legislative re-
form.  It is vital that the United States has a valid, detailed, pi-
racy statute, for piracy is a crime unlike any other.   
Should Congress choose to amend the United States Code, 
Congress has the ability to write anything it desires.  Congress 
did, after all, draft the current version of § 1651.  Ideally, Con-
gress could look to its current provision in § 1651 and 
acknowledge that U.S. legislation demands a clear and precise 
definition of piracy to avoid the constitutional issues of vague-
ness and cruel and unusual punishment while still maintaining 
consistency, and even reaching beyond current customary in-
ternational law.  By amending § 1651, Congress could be much 
more precise in laying out the elements of piracy and the spe-
cific punishments that correspond with the piratical offenses.  
Without Supreme Court intervention, Congress alone has the 
ability to contribute to achieving the goal of the United States 
to act as a general deterrent to piracy.  Congress can write an 
amendment to make the procurement of proper convictions of 
pirates more proficient.   
The UNCLOS definition of piracy is clearly respectable, as 
it is applied by states across the world, including the United 
States.  However, the definition is too narrow.  An amendment 
is needed to clarify the elements, address the issues of vague-
ness and sentencing, and to further expand the law.  Upon the 
implementation of some much needed legislative clarification, 
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U.S. courts would no longer face the problems arising from cas-
es like Said and Dire, and could more systematically convict pi-
rates upon their detentions.   
CONCLUSION 
An amendment to § 1651 will not stop piracy or get other 
countries to prosecute pirates, but it would address the recent 
split in U.S. case law.  United States piracy legislation dates 
back to the Constitution.151  The provision of United States 
Constitution addressing piracy was originally written in 
1787.152  The original provision of § 1651 of the United States 
Code was written over one hundred years ago.153  With advanc-
es in modern technology, both the offense of piracy and piracy 
prevention have changed considerably.  United States courts 
have recently struggled with the ability to convict and sentence 
defendants charged with the crime of piracy.  UNCLOS, a trea-
ty from 1982, contains the most modern definition of piracy, 
and was used by the Fourth Circuit in U.S. v. Dire and in case 
law since154.  
A legislative amendment to the United States Code to up-
date the definition of piracy to be in accordance with UNCLOS 
is imperative.  Given the resurgence of pirate attacks in recent 
times, a stringent and detailed legislative amendment could act 
as a general deterrent to piracy on the high seas.  The United 
States is heading in the right direction with its current piracy 
case law, but an issue of such magnitude deserves statutory 
explication.  Simply because pirates are caught prior to carry-
ing out their planned robbery, they should not allow them to 
escape a conviction of piracy altogether.  However, with an up-
dated statute, proper punishments could be issued for specific 
crimes.  
The United States’ law should embody the goal of its mili-
tary to prevent piracies from occurring before they take place.  
                                                          
151 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. 
152 U.S. CONST. art. VII.  
153 See 18 U.S.C. 1651, (2012), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ us-
code/text/18/1651?quicktabs_8=2#quicktabs-8.  
154 See United States v. Salad, 908 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D.Va 2012) (apply-
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A modern, binding definition of piracy in the United States 
should be drafted to reflect the definition of piracy in accord-
ance with the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, UNCLOS, 
and customary international law, while also building on newer, 
more precise principles to take into account the recent progres-
sion in the recurring offenses of piracy.  By identifying a pre-
cise and less expansive definition of piracy, United States Con-
gress would essentially be able to reward United States 
military efforts by appropriately convicting and sentencing cap-
tured pirates.  There would be no constitutional claims as to 
vagueness or mandated life sentences, and instead would exist 
black letter law capable of properly convicting the wide array of 
piratical crimes currently being committed on the high seas.  
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